Abstract
INTRODUCTION
In the military domain many C2 networks are used. These networks are used to convey information from sender to receiver. In case of hierarchical networks the command and control centre is at the top of the network. To get full context awareness it is necessary to process the incoming information. Operators in those centres are confronted with a tsunami of messages and are supposed to process the incoming data 24 hours, 7 days in a week. Obviously, there is a need of automated systems to support operators during their work.
Figure1. ScanEagle launched from Zr.Ms.Rotterdam
A special type of C2 networks are surveillance networks. The use of sensor networks has been proposed for military surveillance and environmental monitoring applications. Those systems deploy a heterogeneous set of sensors to observe the environment. For example, unmanned vehicles (UAV's) such as the ScanEagle (ScanEagle, 2013) are able to survey an environment with their high tech video camera system. The recordings are transmitted to the ground station which is connected to the control room via a C2-network. To navigate the drones and to inspect the video recordings many operators are needed in the ground station. In general, observed data has to be processed automatically, and finally has to be displayed in a control room.
In the control room observed data is monitored by human operators. They are supposed to give a semantic interpretation to the observed data. In case of suspicious or unwanted behaviour they start an alert procedure. The increase of surveillance cameras in the military domain requires an exponential growth of the number of human operators which is far beyond available human and financial resources. So there is a need to automate the semantic interpretation process of sensor data. Most distributed networks of video sensors are wireless connected and suffer from limited bandwidth, storage and processing capacity. To transfer the data from point to point, the data has to be filtered and aggregated to short messages. Information captured from different sensors from different complexity and modality has to be fused.
Most networks support smart search agents. Those agents are able to search automatically and independently for relevant information. Smart agents are also used to control the information flow and to secure the network. Nowadays, agents can be designed that are able to read coded text in different formats. The automated processing of pictures and video is more complex (VSAM, 1996) . Video footage of surveillance cameras is still processed by human operators. A surveillance system must be able to detect and track objects in the field of views (FOV) of the cameras, classify these objects and detect some of their activities. It should also be capable of generating a description of the events happening within its field of view. But the ultimate challenge is to give a semantic interpretation of the observed events. That is why human operators are usually needed in control and command centres. But as stated before, constantly monitoring by human operators is no longer an option.
In this chapter smart agents are defined in C2 networks. They are modelled after human model and replace the role of human operators. A great advantage of such agents is that they can easily by defined in great numbers, they are able to operate continuously with a high quality of performance all the time. Another advantage of the use of such agents is that they are not localized on specific places as human operators in control stations, but are able to operate throughout the whole network. The use of agents transforms C2 networks into smart networks with a hierarchical structure of locally processing independent units, solving the common drawbacks of human operators.
As a proof of concept an automatic surveillance project will be discussed in this chapter. The project is about the AIS-Automated Identification System (Vessel tracking, 2013) which will be used to monitor ship movements. Since the increase of terroristic attacks, also in Europe there is a need for a surveillance system along the coast of Europe to detect Intruders and suspicious ship movements. Vessels fitted with AIS transceivers and transponders can be tracked by AIS base stations located along coast lines or, when out of range of terrestrial networks, through a growing number of satellites that are fitted with special AIS receivers. Information provided by AIS equipment, such as unique identification, position, course, and speed, can be displayed on a screen or an ECDIS (AIS, 2013). AIS was designed for the safety of ships. Visibility of ships, even in bad weather conditions is necessary to prevent collisions. At this moment even small military ships and unmanned surface vehicles will be equipped with AIS transponders. This increases the context awareness of the C2 network. Ships and their movements will be displayed in real time automatically. How to handle such a huge amount of data, to monitor these data and generate a semantic interpretation, is the main research topic of this chapter.
Currently ship movements are monitored by human operators in control rooms. To automate this surveillance system some questions have to be discussed. The first question is about the topology of the surveillance network, to design a central or decentralized system. Because of the multiple sensors and limited bandwidth of the surveillance network, local processing of observed data is needed. Questions about this local data processing will be solved by designing a network of smart agents running on the surveillance network. The next question is where to store the recorded data. To this end, a system of distributed blackboards will be introduced.
The developed system should be able to perform:
• Automatic identification, localization and tracking of ships in a parallel way, using observed AIS data • Store recorded tracks in a database
• Visualize recorded tracks
• Automatically analyse recorded tracks
• Monitor and control fishing fleet movements
• Investigate accidents
• Protect critical infrastructure, such as military harbours and installation against piracy, terroristic attacks and intruders • Generate alerts and alarms after probabilistic/deterministic reasoning/processing.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the next section we give overview of related projects and research. Then we present different aspects of sensor surveillance networks. Finally we report about a surveillance network implemented by researchers of the Netherlands Defence Academy (Scholte, 2013; Rothkrantz & Scholte, 2013) . At the end of the chapter there is a general conclusion.
RELATED WORK
The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Information Systems Office is funding research into Video Surveillance and Monitoring technology under BAA 96-14, Image Understanding for Battlefield Awareness (VSAM, 1996) . The objective of the VSAM project is to develop automated video understanding technology for use in future urban and battlefield surveillance and monitoring applications. Under BAA 96-14, one Integrated Feasibility Demonstration (IFD) contract was awarded to a team composed of Carnegie Mellon University and the David Sarnoff Research Center (Collins et al., 1999) . The Defender and Agile Programs formed the foundation of DARPA sensor surveillance. In 2013 DARPA launched a device for a ground sensor (video) based on Android technology for surveillance purposes and network processing. This device is related to the concept of smart dust (Rothkrantz et al., 2010) .
Sensor networks in distributed wireless communication technology and its applications in military surveillance have been discussed by He et al. (2004) . They developed a new data aggregation algorithm called AIDA for wireless sensor networks. A surveillance network of smart cameras for a military area was developed by Hameete et al. (2012) AMASS (2010) (Autonomous Marine Surveillance System) is a European project which draws on the latest technology to provide a reliable, round-the-clock maritime monitoring solution. A line of buoys located offshore ensures comprehensive coverage of territorial waters. Each buoy is equipped with the latest visual and acoustic sensors. When a suspicious vessel is detected, images can be transmitted directly to a control centre on shore. This provides authorities with unprecedented observation capabilities an enables them to take swift appropriate action. (MSC 2011 (MSC , 2012 .
The Automatic Identification System (AIS-Wik, 2013) is an automatic traffic system used for identifying and locating vessels by electronically exchanging data with other nearby ships. It was developed in the 1990s as a high intensity, short range identification and tracking network. But since 2005 AIS receivers were deployed at satellites by companies as exactEarth. The use of satellites enables operators to receive a huge amount of AIS messages. Correlating optical and radar imagery with AIS data results in rapid identification of all types of vessels. Satellite-based radar and other sources can contribute to maritime surveillance by detecting all vessels in specific maritime areas of interest. This is a particularly useful attribute when trying to co-ordinate a long-range rescue effort or when dealing with Vessel Traffic Services issues, collision avoidance, fishing fleet monitoring and control, maritime security, pirate surveillance, search and rescue, and accident investigation.
ASPECTS OF SENSOR AND OPERATOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS

Large Scale Surveillance Systems
The Atlantic Wall was an extensive system of coastal fortifications built by Nazi Germany between 1942 and 1945 along the western coast of Europe and Scandinavia. It was designed as a defense against an anticipated Allied invasion of the mainland continent from Great Britain (Hakim, 1995) . Field Marshal Erwin Rommel improved the Atlantic wall by adding reinforced pillboxes built along the beaches. From those pillboxes the sea was monitored by human observers. All the local command post along the sea were connected to each other and finally to the central command post in Berlin. Nowadays, there is no longer a need for protection against large scale invasion. Instead, a new, daunting task is the protection against (invasion by) terrorist, criminals and illegal persons. Given the large area that has to be protected, observation by human operators along the Atlantic coast is no option. Human operators have to be replaced by sensor surveillance systems .To be more precise, in the next section we propose a mixture of sensors of varying complexity and human observers. Smart sensors are able to process observed data locally and can be placed in distributed sensor networks. In the next section we will introduce a hierarchy of C2 sensor networks. Some sensors are components of a centralized network and transmit recorded data to communication centres for further processing and interpretation. As an application we introduce a huge sensor network of AIS data.
Nowadays ship movements along the coast of Europe and the North Sea are monitored by the AIS system. Vessels fitted with AIS transceivers and transponders can be tracked by AIS base stations located along coast lines or, when out of range of terrestrial networks, through a growing number of satellites that are fitted with special AIS receivers. Information provided by AIS equipment, such as unique identification, position, course, and speed, can be displayed on a screen or an ECDIS, compare Klein (1999) claims that there is a difference between human and automated observation and reasoning. He states that human operators generate a hypothesis using their experience when confronted with relevant patterns. When people need to make a decision they can quickly match the situation to the patterns they have learned during training in the past. If they find a clear match, they can carry out the most typical course of action. In that way, people can successfully make extremely rapid decisions. Human operators are unable or not willing to consider alternatives simultaneously. They stick to the first hypothesis and give it up only if many contradictory data becomes available that supports an alternative hypothesis. This perspective took advantage of new developments in cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence such as knowledge representation, concepts of scripts, schemas, and mental models, to contrast expert versus novice behaviour.
An automated surveillance system should be able to reason about many hypotheses in parallel. Computational methods, such as Bayesian reasoning and classifiers, are used to make an optimal choice. According to Klein this automated way of reasoning is quite different from the human way of reasoning called Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). Both methods have in common that experience, historical data are needed to develop human way of reasoning or to train automated systems. Moreover, they don't allow innovative thinking. Human experts come up with solutions experienced in the past, while in computational systems possible solutions are defined a priori by the designer. Recently new ways of creative thinking based on computational methods have been developed. In such a bottom up approach, most salient and relevant features are combined in an innovative way ). Klein states in (1987 Klein states in ( , 1999 ) that the U.S. Navy became interested in naturalistic decisions following the 1988 USS Vincennes shoot-down incident, in which a U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser destroyed an Iranian commercial airliner, mistaking it for a hostile attacker. Both the Army and the Navy wanted to help people make high-stakes decisions under extreme time pressure and under dynamic and uncertain conditions. The first NDM conference, in 1989, assembled researchers studying decision making in field settings. In a chapter that emerged from that meeting, Raanan Lipshitz (1993) identified no less than nine NDM models that had been developed in parallel. One of these was Hammond's cognitive continuum theory (Hammond et al., 1987) , which asserts that decisions vary in the degree to which they rely on intuitive and analytical processes. Conditions such as amount of information and time available, determine where decisions fall on this continuum and whether people rely more on patterns or on functional relationships.
A second account of decision making was Rasmussen's (1985) model of cognitive control, which distinguished skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based behaviour operating within the context of a decision ladder that permitted heuristic cut-off paths. • overlapping clouds of actors (human sensors, perception devices)
Actor-Agent Community in C2 Networks
• corresponding clouds of representative agents
• C2 centre and clouds of services.
In the first layer human observers observe the surrounding world and communicate with each other within that layer. The observed information will be communicated to the control room, outside world or stored in a database via a communication layer. In the communication layer the information will be processed by a process of filtering, aggregation and fusion. It is important to note that human observers are trained observers sensitive to specific features. Observed data from sensors is under control of human and will be processed and interpreted by human operators.
A sensor surveillance system is composed of several layers and components ) (see Fig. 4 ):
• a human communication layer
• a virtual communication layer
• a layer of virtual coordinating agents.
At the highest level the real world is observed by sensors and human observers. Sensors are designed to observe specific features and events. Human observers have specific role and task in the observation process. Both are modelled as agents. (In the agent community there is no difference between actors and agents.) The observation area is covered by different sets of actor-agents with overlapping field of views. Human observers are assumed to report their observations to the surveillance system via handhelds. Sensors are wired or wireless connected to the surveillance system report by means of communication devices. In the kernel of the network is a layer of coordinating agents. This layer is connected to human operators in the control room. It is important to notice that a sensor surveillance system as an actor-agent community is beyond human control. Currently hybrid systems are used under full or limited human control. This will be discussed in more details in our case study.
Every human observer has a digital counterpart, a personal 'guardian angel' taking care of his wellbeing and taking care of the communication with other parts of the system. It is important to notice that human observers are not aware of the communication of personal agents, and have only partly control of the communication between agents. Nowadays, a decentralised approach is very common in military missions. Seals can be dropped in a hostile area to perform their mission without central control. Communication with a central control room will reveal their position to the enemy. The innovative aspect is that a sensor surveillance network is populated by agents. In the actor-agent community, agents and human operators are both modelled as agents and can play similar roles.
According to its definition, agents are autonomous pieces of software, able to perceive the world, reason about it and take appropriate actions. Agents extract knowledge from the surrounding world. This information is placed on blackboards, shared by a cluster of agents. Every blackboard has special functions to combine, aggregate, update, communicate or delete information. In a surveillance network there can be one central blackboard or a hierarchical network of distributed blackboards. From bottom to the top there is a fusion of low sensor information up to high semantic information. The concept of an actor agent community and a network of blackboards was first introduced by Rothkrantz (Tatomir et al., 2006; Fitrianie et al., 2009 ).
Centralized, Decentralized, Multimodal Surveillance Systems
A sensor surveillance network can be composed of different kinds of sensors ranging from radar, sonar to camera systems. To localise, for example, a submarine a sonar system can be used. Another option is to connect the submarine to a floating GPS system. However, GPS doesn't function below the sea level. To navigate, locally a network of floating smart dust can be used (Rothkrantz, 2010) . To obtain visual information from above the water surface information from a drone equipped with camera can be used. Such a sensor network may cover a huge area. If wireless networks are involved, such a network has to handle the limitations in bandwidth and storage capacity. Here, a central approach has its limitations and a distributed system is more appropriate.
Every individual sensor monitors its own area and has a limited span of control. In our case study to be discussed later, the information extracted by the sensor is processed locally and send to the local blackboard which is shared by the global blackboards. Semantic interpretation of observed events starts with observations of sensors that are remote in place and time and are from different modality. The fusion of observed data from multiple sensors is performed at the blackboard systems. Observation and processing of data is a distributed process. Due to the huge amount of sensors, central processing by human operators is no option anymore. The important question therefore is: do local optimal systems also result in globally optimal systems? A similar paradigm shift is observed in C2 systems in general. Until recently, in C2 system centralised decision making was favoured. In the NEC approach, the decision making process is distributed over the network.
Drones and satellites are able to survey fully automatically. But launching a missile from a drone is still under human control. In fact more than 200 operators, including maintenance staff, navigation staff, etc. are involved to keep one drone operational. In this chapter it is demonstrated that a first step to a fully automated surveillance system is a decision support system. In case of coordinated actions, the man is still in the loop. A dedicated orchestration between global and local decision making is needed. This process is facilitated by the hierarchical blackboard structure.
CASE AIS-SYSTEM
Introduction
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an automatic tracking system used on ships and by Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) (AIS-Live). It uses UHF radio communications to transmit and receive data. Ships are able to detect their position, course and speed using ship's navigational sensors such as global navigational satellite and gyrocompass. Together with the ships name and cargo information, these data can be broadcasted at regular intervals via a VHF transmitter built into AIS transponders. The signals can be received by other ship transponders or land based VTS systems. The data can be displayed on computer screens and will be used for navigation and collision avoidance.
Shipboard AIS transponders have a horizontal range of about 70 km. This is enough to avoid collisions between ships. But for surveillance of ship movements data from large areas are needed. Signals of AIS transponders are able to reach satellites. Currently a network of satellites with AIS transponders takes care of the distribution of AIS data over large areas. AIS position data are now available on the Internet and public domain. This raises a serious question concerning safety of navigation and security of military harbours and transport. Of course, ship movements can be detected by an observer with a binocular, as in the old days of the Atlantic Wall. But, his range of sight will be limited by weather conditions. Ships can also turn off their AIS transponders, but then they are still visible by radar which makes their behaviour suspicious.
The AIS system can be viewed as a huge network of nodes composed in 3 layers:
• Ship layer. At the lowest level ships are modelled as moving nodes. They are linked at neighbouring nodes in a region of 70km. The network is very dynamic; links will be enabled and disabled continuously.
• Satellite layer. Moving satellites are connected to ship nodes within their reach. Satellites are connected to ground stations. The data will be processed at these ground stations and distributed via communication networks such as the World Wide Web • Operator level. Operators are able to connect to the AIS system via WWW. They have to select a region of their interest, and AIS data of ship tracks will be displayed on their computer screen.
It is almost impossible to monitor ship movements 24 hours, 7 days in a week in all possible sea regions for the detection of unwanted behaviour such as violating traffic rules, entering forbidden areas or attacking ships or installations. Command centre need aggregated data to take their decisions. So there is a need to automate the surveillance process at the operator level. The research questions are:
• How to handle huge amounts of data streams in huge, dynamic networks? In some areas thousands of ships can be detected and their tracks should be visualized.
• How to design monitoring agents modelled after human operator mode? Such an agent should be able to monitor data from computer screens, reason about these data, and give a semantic interpretation. Eventually, it should be able to generate an alert to a command centre staffed by human operators.
The proposed solution is to introduce smart agents in the AIS surveillance network. The AIS network is split up in overlapping regions. The ship movements in a region can be displayed on a computer screen. As soon as a ship appears in a region a smart agent will be attached to it as a surveillance agent. We notice that this agent based approach is different from the analysis of a human operator. A human operator usually starts with a global scan of the screen and if a salient feature is detected the operator zooms in, and the situation will be analysed. Our agents track the vessels, and the attached vectors of features will be analysed continuously. Every region has a specific set of unwanted/suspicious behaviour and, as a consequence, a context sensitive surveillance system. In case unwanted behaviour will be detected, the surveillance agent will send a message to the control room, usually via some intermediate steps in the hierarchical network connecting ships, ground stations, sensors, satellites, etc. Because the regions are overlapping, a surveillance agent can move from one region to the other, following the route of a ship. As a proof of concept, the design and implementation of a surveillance system around the military harbour of Den Helder will be presented.
Automated Surveillance
Each Automatic Identification System (AIS) position report gives basic kinematic data: the geographical position and speed vector of a vessel. These can be used to directly trigger simple inference rules or nodes in a network. For example whether a speed limit is violated or whether a vessel is currently in a restricted area. Using multiple (sequential) reports we can derive more complex events (or features) from these basic parameters over time. Important events are change in speed and course, as these may be indicative of more complex events, e.g. anchoring (deceleration at open sea) or departure of a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) (change in course). Changes in course or speed can be inferred using the derivative of either the speed or course function.
The ultimate research challenge is to give a semantic interpretation of the kinematic data. At this moment detection of behaviour and intent takes place in the mind of the operator in the control room, the hierarchical top of the surveillance network. To design an automatic system for assessment of situation awareness after human model, we have to analyse the cognitive model of an operator. Situation awareness consists of three steps. First the operator observes information on his computer display, then he interprets the information so that he understands what it means, and finally he places the meaning of the information in a wider context and forms a mental picture of the situation that is occurring.
The cognitive model of an operator is similar to the BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) model that has been developed for agents as described in (Rao, 1995) .
In the phase called situation awareness the operator tries to form beliefs about what is going on, based on the information displayed on the computer screen. He then defines a set of goals or desires based on those beliefs. With these goals in mind he plans and performs actions (intentions) to achieve those goals. The agent never stops monitoring the system. This means the steps that have been described can be performed in parallel. It might be that the operator, during one of the steps of the process, observes some very important information and might stop the process. Then he begins the process anew based on the new information. An alternative model is based on the OODA loop (Boyd, 1976) as described in the next section.
Figure 5. Map of the harbour of Den Helder
A Human Based AIS Surveillance System
In this section the knowledge extraction from the operator will be described. This knowledge will be the basis of a decision support system. The focus is on the area of the military harbour of Den Helder (Scholte, 2013) .
The basic input of the AIS-based-surveillance system is the identity of the ship, position, and kinematic data such as speed and heading. These data are updated with some sample rate. From these input features more advanced features can be computed, such as trajectories, curvature of trajectories, acceleration, etc. All these detected features can be displayed on the annotated map around the military harbour. An operator is monitoring a computer screen with a map of the area around the harbour. On the map the ship movements sensed by the AIS system, are displayed (see Fig. 5 ). The map is annotated with the following Region of Interest (ROI):
• The main traffic routes, which are identified by logging AIS data for some time. These routes are marked by buoys, transmitting light and radio signals. Ships are supposed to sail within traffic routes. At special crossings they are permitted to take another traffic route.
• Critical infrastructure, such as oil rigs or other strategic locations, entrance of the military harbour, areas around windmill parks.
• Special areas such as fishing grounds that require a permit, shallow areas (bathymetric data), nature reserves.
In general the ROI's are no-go areas or areas with limited access. Ships entering this area or intent to enter this area show deviant, suspicious or unwanted behaviour. But the list of unwanted behaviour is not limited to entering forbidden areas. Based on interviews with human operators the following classes of salient and possible unwanted behaviour have to be considered:
• Sudden change of directions, sharp U-turns. There is a risk that these sudden movements will not be detected by other ships in time.
• Deviant sailing behaviour such as continuous change of heading, change of speed or even stopping. Such a snake-like behaviour, could be caused by mechanical problems or by personal factors of the captain (drunk/ill/incompetent captain).
• Intent of intrusion in ROI's. Some critical infrastructures are surrounded by special forbidden areas.
• Intent of collision. Every ship is surrounded by a personal space which should not be intruded.
• Leaving traffic separation corridors at unexpected place and time or sailing outside usual corridors. The sea maps are annotated with traffic separation corridors, computed using historical data.
• Violating traffic rules, such as surpassing speed limit, entering military areas without permission or anchoring close to oil platforms.
• Sailing at unexpected/forbidden place and time.
• Switching off the AIS system at unexpected place and time.
Finally all these unwanted behaviours will be filtered and results in an alert send to the operator room if the probability that a behaviour or combination of behaviours is suspicious passes a threshold.
A human operator is supposed to monitor all the displayed ship tracks continuously. He has special characteristics to perform this task. In the first place he is able to focus his attention on the place where the action is, and adapt the level of attention. Secondly, he is able to zoom in and zoom out and include context information. Thirdly, he is able to fuse events distributed in place and time. And last but not least he is able to handle incomplete, ambiguous data updated with different sample rates. To perform this challenging tasks a human operator has a high qualified perception system, which is very sensitive to small movements and unusual events. He has a short term and long term memory, a well developed reasoning system and is able to monitor and evaluate his own actions. In fact a human operator is difficult to emulate as a digital agent.
To design an automated system to survey a large area covered by the AIS system, it is necessary to split up the area in smaller parts, analyse these parts in parallel and again and again combine the results, to come up with a context awareness of the whole area. In the next section the implementation of such an automated system will be presented.
Design of an AIS Surveillance System
The task of the surveillance system is to detect unwanted behaviour automatically. Just like the operator based system, the input of the automated system is the kinematic AIS data, such as position, speed, track, heading and the identity of the ship. As mentioned before the challenge of an automated system is to give a semantic interpretation of the kinematic data. One of the problems to solve is that observed data is distributed in place and time. Usually a sequence of events is observed. As soon as the first events are observed, the system has to come up with a tentative interpretation and a prediction of possible future events. For example, in case of a terroristic attack in the harbour aimed at exploding an oil reservoir, the system registries the behaviour intrusion ROI of critical infrastructure. But to take appropriate defence action it is necessary to detect intent to intrude a ROI long before. Such events can only be detected with some probability. Two approaches will be presented, a rule based system and a Bayesian system.
Rule Based System
In (Rothkrantz & Scholte, 2013 ) the authors present a decision support system. The decision support system is modelled after human operator model. Operators in the control room of the Coast Guard at Den Helder were interviewed. They were requested to answer open questions and to give an interpretation of selected screen dumps of AIS data. It shows that an operator is triggered by unusual events, generates a hypothesis about the possible ongoing situation, validates this hypothesis by new data and generates an action. This procedure is very similar to the well-known OODA loop (Boyd, 1976) . The knowledge/expertise of the human operator has to be extracted from the experts by interviews and comments of operators confronted with simulated suspicious events. The knowledge of the operator is represented as if-then rules. A well-known expert system shell CLIPS (Boullart et al., 1992) was used to implement the knowledge rules and to design a reasoning procedure. Features extracted from the AIS system are fed into the expert system and the system generates possible actions.
IF <trigger> THEN Suggest <hypothesis <hypothesis> confirmed by <validation tests>
If <validation tests> THEN DO <action> Figure 6 . Simplified model of traffic monitoring operator cognitive processes.
The knowledge elicitation task was again realised by interviewing the experts in the human control room. These experts were requested to report about their past experience using the OODA loop model. While monitoring the computer displays with AIS data, they reported about salient triggers, which hypothesis was generated, how they are evaluated and which action has to be generated. A list of triggers, hypothesis, evaluation and actions was generated and corresponding IF-THEN rules. The system was implemented using CLIPS, an expert system toolkit.
Operators act according to a processing information model, as shown in Fig. 6 . We distinguish two types of processes: a rule-based flow, and a knowledge-based flow. Note the absence of a skill-based track. An operator cycles through his set of Region Of Interest (ROI). In some cases he might see unexpected behaviour from a contact. This abnormality is either a violation he recognizes, or a possible violation that is not instantly recognizable for which more information is required. In the former case, the operator associates a rule with the violation after which a corresponding action is triggered. For example, a vessel is observed speeding in the port and subsequently the harbour police is informed to fine the vessel. In the latter case, things are more complex. An abnormality is observed, but it is unclear to the operator which or even if a violation has been committed by the contact. This leads to the operator gathering more information on the situation.
Another approach is to annotate the tracks of ships as displayed in Fig 8, 9 . The onset and offset of detected behaviour can be indicated, using markers or different colours for behaviour and intensities. A sequence of behaviours has a special semantic interpretation in general. In general a sequence of unwanted behaviours is even more unwanted. Let us consider special sequences of behaviours (see Fig. 7 ). The data process starts with sampling data. At discrete time steps a vector of AIS data will be sensed such as position, speed, heading. From that data some feature vectors will be extracted or computed such as change of speed, change of heading TSS, ROI. A semantic interpretation can be given to a sequence of time stamped features. We consider two examples:
Example1. Let us consider a ship leaving his trajectory (TSS) and takes a sharp turn .Then it enters an ROI with restricted entrance permission. Finally the AIS system is switched of. This string of features is a typical example of illegal fishing.
Example2. Let us consider a vessel approaching the harbour. Before it enters the harbour it stops and appears to be drifting at sea. No signal from the vessel that anything is wrong. Given the string of features an alert will be generated, because the vessel behaviour us suspicious. Later it turned out that the vessel arrived 2 hours early and its pilot was not available yet.
From the given examples it is clear that it is not always possible to give a unique semantic interpretation of the observed sequence of features. The situation can be very ambiguous or the observed data is not complete. Such sequences of behaviours can be modelled by finite state diagrams or analysed using probabilistic models. A sequence of behaviours can be analysed using a rule based system. First a list of all possible scenarios was defined and possible sequences of behaviours. But usually the system is forced to come up with a semantic interpretation after the onset of the first features. The main goal of the AIS surveillance system is to detect unwanted behaviour as soon as possible. So after the onset of the first behaviour, all possible scenarios are triggered and listed in priorities. After observation of the next scenarios, the first list of possible scenarios has to be reduced and eventually a new scenario gets the highest priority and will eventually generate an alert. In this way the system is able to reason with incomplete, ambiguous data. Considering possible solutions in parallel is feasible for human operators, as stated by Klein (1987 Klein ( , 1999 . In section 3 we cited Klein reporting the incident with the Airliner. If an Airliner and a missile are far away there is a low recognition rate. So it is no option to shoot down every moving object to guarantee that a ship will not be hit by a missile.
One of the disadvantages of using a rule-based system is that IF-THEN rules are always deterministic. Either the IF-condition of the rule is fulfilled or it is not. A certain event or variable value may be an indication for more than one situation. For example, a ship at high speed approaching the harbour wants to embark as soon as possible, or has hostile intents. The rule based system doesn't satisfy the requirements, and a more flexible model is needed. This flexibility can be achieved using a probabilistic model. Basically this models the probability that a situation is occurring, or that it is not occurring based on the information displayed on the computer screen and the reasoning process of the operator. Usually a huge data corpus is needed to compute the Conditional Probability Tables (CPT) in Bayesian networks. But unwanted behaviours are rare events. So it is impossible to gather data by logging data for some time. Military experts have to set the values in the Conditional Probability Tables.
Bayesian Reasoning
Bayesian belief networks are often used in reasoning systems (GeNie and Smile, 2013) . They have proven themselves in a number of applications. Wiggers et al., (2011) present a successful application of Bayesian networks in the detection of missiles. In a Bayesian belief network one can indicate the effect that an event has on another event. Bayesian networks can be visualized as directed graphs. Given some evidence (some facts should be specified as being either true or false with a certain probability) the probability of the events one is interested in (the query events) can be calculated. One can also state that it is not completely certain that an event has happened, but is has happened with a certain probability. This probability is then taken into account when the probability of the queried event is calculated.
In Fig. 7 a Bayesian model of automated detection of unwanted behaviour has been displayed. At every sampled point t n , kinematic parameters, position and identify will be observed, The position parameter will be matched to the ROI's to compute the distance to the ROI's. Next, the onset of one or more of the unwanted behaviours will be computed from the observed parameters. Finally the probability of an onset of an alert has to be computed. The relationship between the variables related to unwanted behaviour and the generation of an alert is defined by the CPT-tables. Usually in Bayesian networks discrete variables are used. The entries of the conditional probability tables between variables have to be computed or set by experts. A functional relation between variables corresponding to the probabilities of connecting variables has to be computed or defined. In Fig. 7 the probabilistic function between connecting variables is indicated by Pi. These functions are defined as follows:
• P1: Let T(t n ) be the trajectory of a ship. The curvature C(t n ) can be computed with alpha (t n ) as corresponding angle. If alpha increases from zero to 90 degrees, the probability that the ship is turning increases from 0-1 modelled as a sigmoid function such that P1 (30 degrees) is 0.5. Similarly. the probability that the ship is making a U-turn is also modelled as a sigmoid function but with a lower slope, such that P1(90 degree) is 0.5.).
• P2:
Let T(t n ) be the trajectory of a ship and n between 1 and N. Let M be the number of times that the acceleration or heading passes some given threshold. Then P2 is defined as a cumulative Poisson distribution. If a ship stops then P2 will be set to 1 immediately.
• P3:
Let T(t n ) be the trajectory of a ship and d(t n ) the distance between the ship and a critical infra-structure, then P2 is defined as exp(-d n ).
• P4:
A ship is assumed to sail within well-defined traffic separation trajectories. If a ship leaves this trajectory, P4 will be set to 1, and is set to 0 if the ship turns back to the trajectory.
• P5:
If a ship violates the traffic rules, P5 will be set to 1.
P1 is related to ROI with no entrance allowed. But even in case the ship is sailing in open areas, it could be suspicious behaviour if this happens at unexpected times and place. Special ROI have to be defined given place and time. Then P6 is similar to the computation of P1
If a sailing ship turns off his AIS system, then P7 is set to 1.
To compute the probability of the generation of an alert, the probabilities of the observed unwanted behaviours have to combined using a noisy AND-OR approach as an inference method. A first prototype has been implemented and reported in (Rothkrantz & Scholte, 2013) using Genie as a Bayesian reasoning tool.
The Bayesian inference procedure can be executed at every time step t n . The computed probabilities of the generation of an alert at successive time steps are related. This has been studied using the Dynamic Bayesian network version of Genie. Up to now, the duration and intensity of a sequence of unwanted behaviours has not been considered. Recently Scholte (2013) defined a probabilistic version of the observed unwanted behaviours. The probabilities of the observation will increase if the intensity and the duration of the observed behaviours increase. The implemented prototype has been tested and compared to the performance of human operators. It proved that the automatic system generated a lot of false positives caused by the fact that all options were analysed in parallel. The number can be reduced by decreasing the thresholds of generating an alert, but then there is a danger that the number of false negatives increases. 
Experiment Speed and Course Change Detection
To test the designed surveillance system a list of scenarios has been designed, representing one of the classes of unwanted behaviours as defined before. In the database of logged data, examples of such scenarios are looked up and the system has been tested. A scenario of speed and course change detection will be discussed. Many other scenarios are tested.
Consider a vessel executing a turn. Starting from the last point (the most recently received position update), we can calculate the course change using the numerical approximation given in the following Equation:
1 , where C(t) = course at point t, n=last data point, δt=time between data points.
However, there needs to be some form of smoothing or thresholding on the data. Consider a vessel that intends to travel in a straight line. Due to factors such as tide, wind or sea state, the observed track is not straight when looking at a small number of consecutive data points. This may lead to the triggering of events even though the vessel maintains its course.
Therefore we expand upon the Equation above by introducing a sliding window over which the delta values are averaged: ∑ , where C(t) = course at point t, n=last data point, m=window size (in seconds).
This means that we average the cumulative change in course (or speed) between two consecutive data points over the entire window. By using a windowed function, noise in the "signal" caused by environmental factors such as tide, wind or sea state, is suppressed.
Change in course or speed is detected when the above mentioned windowed derivative exceeds a certain threshold. This concept can be translated into a simple algorithm of which the pseudo code given below. Note that this algorithm uses a specified window over which the mean is calculated, as mentioned above. ______________________________________________________________ Algorithm : Detecting course and speed changes in a vessel's track over time.
_______________________________________________________________
Data: Vessel track
Result: Detected changes in course C or speed S /* We assume point index 1 is the most recent point */ 1 Select track points over period m −→ pointList; /* this is the buffer window */ 2 n = length(pointList); 3 δC(1) =pointList(1).course -mean(pointList(2).course to pointList(n).course) /m; 4 δS(1) =pointList(1).speed -mean(pointList(2).speed to pointList(n).speed) / m; The algorithm described above was used to detect changes in course and speed of vessels. As an example of how this behaves with real data, Fig. 8 shows the track of the "MV Nestor".
A moving window size (m = 60s) was used, a course change threshold Tc was set at 0.08deg/s and a speed change threshold Ts = 0.01kts/s. The total track length is 39736s; or approximately 11 hours. The "Nestor" (mmsi = 244688000) is a vessel used for sea fishing trips. Depicted in the Fig. 8 is the vessel returning to its port of call, Den Helder. Note that the first AIS position report is the most recently received one and the last the oldest. The course and speed parameters are quite noisy. This is to be expected as wind, tide and sea state have a large impact on these parameters. The noisy characteristics can also be found in the derivatives of both parameters. Similar output can be observed when looking at vessels with a more stable course and speed, e.g. those that are in a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter surveillance networks are researched and one application is presented. The application was focused on surveillance of a military harbour and its environment using the AIS system. It shows that it was possible to give a semantic interpretation of sensed kinematic data distributed via the AIS network. The designed system can be used as a fully automated system or as a decision support system in the control room by human operators. In surveillance networks smart sensors survey the environment. They replace human observers. It is no option to have human observers anytime, anywhere. The sensors are modelled after a human observer. A well-known model to emulate human observation is the OODA loop. The sensors are distributed over a large area. The agents in the network are not localized in space and time but distributed and moving round the network all the time. To convey the observed information to the control room it is necessary to fuse data recorded by different sensors, to aggregate the information and to give a semantic interpretation of the recorded information. For that reason a hierarchical structure of distributed blackboards has been introduced. The human way of observation and reasoning is implemented in the smart sensors. This is why sensors are modelled as software agents moving around in the surveillance network. At the end the information is conveyed to the control room and displayed on computer screens in a user friendly way. Again it is no option to have human operators monitoring those screens 24/7 hours. Special agents have been designed that are able to monitor the screens, to reason about the observed information and to generate an alert in case unusual events or unwanted or suspicious behaviours have been detected.
The innovative aspect of this chapter is the reduction of the role of human operators. They are replaced by sensors and software agents which are able to observe, reason and behave in a human like way. This type of surveillance networks enables surveillance of large areas as the Atlantic Coast, critical infrastructures and special objects.
One aspect has not been discussed in the chapter, the security of the network. The introduction of a virtual space of agents enables a smart surveillance system. But unfortunately it offers intruders of the network the option to design agents destroying the positive effects of the surveillance network. To prevent a battlefield of agents in the virtual space, it is necessary to secure the network for intruders and to design counterattacks if intruders are detected.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this chapter a prototype has been described of a surveillance system using AIS data. The focus of the system was to detect abnormal behaviour of ships in and around the military harbour at Den Helder, The Netherlands. As a next step, the prototype has to be developed to a full operational system and should include all the AIS areas along the Atlantic Coast. In the introduction of this chapter we mentioned at least 7 functionalities of the Surveillance system. The current prototype is limited to detection of unwanted behaviour. Similar systems can be developed that send personal alerts to ships in possible danger due to upcoming bad weather conditions. Other possible applications are to the detection of illegal fishing, or the analysis of ship accidents. Another interesting application is to use the system as a surveillance system for all open waters. For their own safety more and more small ships install AIS systems, and this enables surveillance systems to monitor them
The current AIS based system should be integrated with available radar or camera surveillance systems. The fusion of data from different sources and modalities is a special research challenge. At the end, the current decision support system should be developed as a full automated system. The current system has been preliminary tested at the control room of the Coast Guard at Den Helder. A full human computer interaction test has to be performed in the near future.
